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Abstract
This paper explains the resilience of clientelism in Argentina from 1989 to 1999, or the years of
Carlos Menem’s presidency. Menem enacted sweeping neoliberal reforms, which leading
theories predicted would extinguish clientelism. Nevertheless, it persisted throughout the decade.
The paper first reconstructs the concept of clientelism, presenting a definition of the
phenomenon. It then tests and finds support for two hypotheses to explain its resilience. The first,
from the leading school of thought in the literature, predicts that the use of clientelism decreases
with an increase in competition. I suggest a new hypothesis that Menem’s position relative to the
Peronist party influences his decision to pursue the clientelist linkage. If he is in a dominant
position, then he is likely to choose clientelism.
Keywords: conceptual reconstruction, clientelism, neoliberalism, political competition, Peronist
party
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I.

Introduction
Given Carlos Menem’s Peronist campaign rhetoric, no one expected him to embrace

neoliberalism in 1989. That he did so vigorously and with considerable success—thereby
managing an economic miracle—was surprising; that the use of clientelism contributed to his
success defied theory. This paper focuses on the last puzzle, which continues to elude political
science. Specifically, it seeks to explain the resilience of clientelism in Menem’s Argentina, the
decade of 1989 to 1999. During his tenure, he privatized state assets while transforming the
Peronist party into a clientelist, machine-based party (Levitsky 2003). Most work focuses on the
early years of his administration, or the height of neoliberal reform. The tail end of his
presidency, too, has received considerable attention from scholars, who look to understand the
2001 collapse of the Argentine economy. These remarkable periods alone, however, cannot
explain the conditions in which politicians pursue clientelist strategies. As such, the half-life of
the clientelism-neoliberalism duo warrants further study as it may be consequential for
democratic functioning.
Much of the economic restructuring that continues to influence Argentine politics
occurred in the years leading up to Menem’s reelection in 1995. And clientelism often mediated
such restructuring, an interesting fact for several reasons. First, Menem was arguably in a
position to push for plebiscitarian linkages, connecting him directly to voters. He nevertheless
invested in clientelist linkages, thus opting for a system with intermediaries on whom he relied to
accomplish his political goals. Indeed, the paper finds that he selected clientelism on several
occasions at different points in his tenure. Second, theory predicts that clientelism should not
exist in conditions of economic strain. The logic here is that, as the state’s role in the economy
decreases, politicians should have less access to resources which they can use for clientelist
purposes. Yet, again, machine politics prevailed in Argentina’s neoliberal years. Its resilience

4
raises questions about the functioning of democracy since—at a minimum—there is a tension
between the existence of clientelism in democratic regimes. Where voters exchange their right to
political representation for benefits, it becomes unclear whether popular sovereignty defines
democracy. The inconsistency between clientelism, present in a number of democracies, and
democratic representation indicates that the topic at hand is significant.
To explain Menem’s use of clientelism, I first need to examine the concept itself. I
review existing conceptualizations by concept type and offer my own definition in the classical
structure. I then apply my concept to explore the question of resilience through the creation of
three case studies in the Menem presidency. Process tracing functions as the method through
which I test my hypothesis that Menem’s relationship to the Peronist party accounts for the
persistence of clientelism. I also test the leading hypothesis in the literature that political
competition explains variation in clientelism. The results for both hypotheses emphasize the
importance of understanding the concept as a system. Overall, I find that the economically
improbable is politically feasible, but with significant implications for the quality of democracy.
Clientelism is simultaneously the guardian of democracy—allowing painful economic reforms to
occur in a democratic context—and its assailant attacking it from within.
II.

Conceptualizing Clientelism
Clientelism is one of those terms that mean different things to different people. For some,

it brings to mind an unequal, personal relationship, which functions to control the weaker party;
for others, it is a simple exchange of benefits with political consequences. A wide range of
understandings occupies the space between these ends of the spectrum, and almost every writer
on the subject offers a different definition. Disagreement over the definition of clientelism
undermines its utility as a valuable explanatory tool (Landé 1983, 441). Scholars have used it to
explain the political behavior of subaltern classes in three related aspects: their incorporation into
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the political process, inability to form horizontal associations with peers, and as a method of
seeking security in uncertain environments (e.g., Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Graziano 1983;
Powell 1970; Scott 1972). The concept also illustrates, then, the behavior of higher authority
actors such as politicians and brokers; that is, it explains the actions of those on the dominant
side of clientelist deals (Kaufman 1974, 302). Clientelism hence remains an appealing concept
for the student of development and perhaps especially so given its resilient quality. In fact, it has
reentered the mainstream political science literature after defying theoretical expectations.1
Neither democratization nor modernization, for instance, has extinguished the phenomenon.
Clientelism is alive and well throughout the developing world—and though the concept may be
abstract, its effects are not.2
The extant literature maintains that clientelism negatively affects democracy by
threatening mechanisms of accountability. If a clientelist exchange entails a surrendering of
political rights for benefits, then citizens lose the ability to hold their politicians accountable
(Hicken 2011, 302). Moreover, politicians can hold voters accountable by withholding benefits
based on voting results, what Stokes (2005) has termed “perverse accountability.” On the
economic front, clientelism hinders development by incentivizing governments to perpetuate
poverty among constituents. These adverse effects and the concept’s empirical relevance indicate
that clientelism is worth understanding.
While the literature agrees on the negative implications of clientelism, disagreement
persists over its conceptual core; thus, the literature is not in a position to resolve it or abate its
consequences. An understanding of the phenomenon’s nature must precede structural policy

1

Stokes (2011) labels this the second wave of studies on clientelism. Prominent works include Piattoni
(2001), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), and Stokes et al. (2013).
2
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2017, for instance, notes the persistence of clientelism and
its role in undermining democracy.
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recommendations (Goertz 2006). Yet an understanding of clientelism is insufficient; one must be
conscious of the mechanism of understanding. Put differently, the how, or method of
conceptualization (concept type), matters as much as the what. Agreement on characteristics that
define clientelism does not equal agreement on empirical cases of the phenomenon; true
understanding requires study of concept types (Barr 2017, 26).
This section aims to shed light on the concept of clientelism. First, it discusses the nature
of concepts in the social sciences and provides an overview of three conceptualization strategies.
It then evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each type, finding that an ideal strategy
does not exist. Rather, the concept-builder should evaluate how each type serves her goals
regarding the essence of clientelism. Although clarity should be a product of each
conceptualization, it is likely that choice of characteristics will vary based on discipline. A
definition of clientelism emerges from this section’s conceptual exploration of the phenomenon.
Background on Concepts
Concepts are the foundation and building blocks of knowledge in the social sciences. One
must answer the question of “what is” before asking “how much.” In other words, qualitative
conceptualization should precede quantitative research (Sartori 1970, 1038). There is a positive
relationship between a concept’s quality and its quantitative measure. According to Giovanni
Sartori, a dominant figure in concept development, a concept is the “basic unit of thinking” that
allows a researcher to “distinguish A from whatever is not-A” (1984, 74). Although there is a
lack of consensus on the definition of concept, Sartori’s definition appears to best suit the
research goals of political science. Moreover, an unequivocal understanding of the word concept
is unlikely and unnecessary (Adcock 2005, 31). Of greater importance is increased
methodological awareness through conceptual reconstruction: a process that entails reviewing
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the meanings of a concept (Sartori 1984, 50). Specifically, it is “an explication that consists of
extracting (and ordering) the characteristics from the definitions of a term” (Sartori 1984, 74).
When successful, conceptual reconstruction enhances the clarity of a given phenomenon and
provides a base for concept formation (Sartori 1984, 50).3
A concept has three components: 1) phenomena to be clarified; 2) characteristics that
define the phenomena; and 3) the term that captures the first two components (Gerring 1999,
357-8). Concept scholars refer to the first component, or a concept’s empirical coverage, as
extension (Goertz 2006, 69). Intension, by contrast, denotes the attributes of a concept. Students
of concept design can understand these three components as a triangular operation. Proper
conceptualization aligns all three components in service of the observed phenomena (Gerring
1999, 358).
The relationship between intension and extension drives a significant amount of the
scholarly debate on concept development. Most scholars maintain that there is an inverse
relationship between the two components (Collier and Mahon 1993, 846).4 As intension
increases, extension decreases: if the concept-builder increases the number of attributes, then the
concept’s coverage decreases. Sartori, motivated by comparative politics, sought to resolve the
tension between intension and extension. More precisely, he was concerned that conceptual
traveling was not possible because of the level of specificity that characterized his concepts of
interest (Goertz 2006, 71). Conceptual traveling refers to the application of a concept to other
cases, countries, or time periods. Thus, Sartori wanted to make concepts more general, without
3

Reconstruction has its limits in that it cannot restore consensus on a given concept; therefore, it is not a
panacea, but an essential step in furthering our understanding of the world (Sartori 1984, 50).
4
One should note, however, that there are different ways of understanding concepts. For instance, Giovanni
Sartori (1970) favors a semantic approach, whereas Gary Goertz (2006) emphasizes an ontological view of concepts.
These approaches respectively inform each scholar’s preferred conceptualization strategy (necessary and sufficient
condition structure for Sartori and family resemblance structure for Goertz), which, in turn, has implications for the
intension-extension relationship. To be fair, Sartori is not explicit regarding his views on concept structure, but it is
likely that the necessary and sufficient structure represents his beliefs (Goertz 2006, 70).
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committing the “sin” of conceptual stretching (Collier and Mahon 1993, 846). To stretch a
concept is to increase extension without regard for a change in intension. Conceptual stretching,
then, results in a generality, not a general concept. While a general concept arises naturally from
an accumulation of specifics, a generality lacks such grounding (Sartori 1970, 1041).
Sartori’s ladder of abstraction resolves the problem of conceptual stretching and allows
more generalization (1970, 1040). The ladder consists of three levels of abstraction, which the
concept-builder should navigate inductively. Put differently, one should start at the low level by
engaging in fieldwork and climb the ladder as she decides, based on the evidence, which
classification best suits the phenomena (Sartori 1970, 1043). In operational terms, to climb the
ladder is to remove necessary attributes or decrease intension and increase extension (Sartori
1970, 1041).
Concept Types
Three types of conceptualization guide the present study: classical, family resemblance,
and radial.5 These are the main concept types, making them appropriate for a reconstruction of
clientelism. Furthermore, they set the groundwork for the empirical components of this study.
The classical strategy utilizes the necessary and sufficient condition structure and operates
through the logical “and” (Goertz 2006, 40). Each characteristic is necessary and all are required
for sufficiency. Cases must meet all of the set characteristics to qualify as examples of the
concept. This strategy has high standards for inclusion, but it also reduces the risk of false
positives. Ergo, a case that meets these ambitious standards warrants careful study (Weyland
2001, 2). Such demanding criteria, however, can result in narrow extension, and if the concept is
not empirically useful, then it does not contribute to the accumulation of knowledge.
5

Nevertheless, there exists a multitude of types. Some examples include comparative, connotative,
contextual, core, deductive, denotative, experiential, inductive, lexical, metrical, minimal, nominal, object, precising,
residual, and stipulative. See Gerring (1999, 365) for more.
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In contrast, the family resemblance structure relies on the logical “or.” It does not require
that phenomena meet any single characteristic for membership. Consequently, this strategy
allows for sufficiency without necessity (Goertz 2006, 41). If the case has at least some of the
identified characteristics, it qualifies as an instance of the concept. This approach is the “m of n
rule,” which states that if a case meets a predetermined number of characteristics, then it counts
as a case of the concept under study (Goertz 2006, 40). Thus, the sufficiency threshold
supersedes the nature of a given characteristic.
Radial concepts capture elements of classical and family resemblance structures. For a
given concept, this structure specifies an ideal type and accompanying subtypes (Collier and
Mahon 1993). The former approximates the classical standard of necessary characteristics (all of
which are required for sufficiency); the latter require fewer characteristics and serve as diluted
versions of the ideal type. The concept developer categorizes these versions as diminished
subtypes through qualifying adjectives and thereby achieves differentiation while avoiding
conceptual stretching. As such, radial concepts foster some conceptual agreement (Collier and
Mahon 1993, 848). Yet, this consensus may be illegitimate because the diminished subtype may
function to obscure the concept (Goertz 2006, 94). In other words, agreement on the subtype can
mask disagreement regarding the concept.
The earlier discussion of intension and extension becomes more concrete when applied to
concept types. The dynamics also aid in understanding the costs and benefits associated with
each type. For example, an inverse relationship connects classical and family resemblance
concepts (Goertz 2006, 71-72). As the concept developer adds additional characteristics, she
increases the intension and, in doing so, narrows the extension for the classical concept structure.
This same action, however, has the opposite effect on the family resemblance structure: it
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expands extension. Yet an increase in characteristics outside of the necessary and sufficient
condition structure may jeopardize the goals of reconstruction. Since membership is “all or
nothing,” classical concepts have clearly established boundaries (Goertz 2006, 29). The family
resemblance concept, by contrast, lacks clear boundaries because it has no requirements for
membership. If one evaluates concepts in the Sartori tradition, then family resemblance concepts
are not desirable because they do not solve the “border problem” (1984, 34). Radial concepts
fare better in terms of borders but still fail to provide the dichotomous view of categories that
classify classical concepts. One should therefore approach concept formation from an
understanding that it is a dynamic, not rule based, process. Satisfying one criterion (term,
intension, and extension) of the concept will likely cause another area to suffer: the conceptbuilder must sacrifice some aspects to prioritize others (Gerring 1999, 389).
Understandings of Clientelism
Such prioritization within concept-building assumes that the analyst has already narrowed
her goals. In this case, a conceptualization of clientelism must facilitate empirical study of the
phenomenon in contemporary Argentina. To reiterate, conceptualization aims to elucidate
essence and thus often results in definitions of the phenomena under study. The goal here is to
identify what it (clientelism) is; hence, this section judges a concept structure’s analytical value
according to Sartori’s taxonomic logic.6 This “either-or” approach allows one to identify
differences in kind and thereby achieve conceptual differentiation (Sartori 1970, 1036).
Evaluations of domain, or the “general realm in which the phenomenon predominantly falls,” are
essential to this end (Barr 2017, 31). If analysts understand a concept in terms of the struggle for
or exercise of power, then the concept belongs in the political domain. A focus on the

6

An alternative would be the gradualistic approach with its differences in degree; however, the literature is
not yet in a position to benefit from employing this approach to identify clientelism.
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distribution of resources, however, places the concept in the economic domain. What follows is
an examination of the literature’s conceptualizations of clientelism across domain and concept
structure.
Classical Conceptualizations
In classical conceptualizations, authors vary on their selection of core and secondary
characteristics, but—in keeping with the classical structure—agree that all those characteristics
they posit are necessary for a concept of clientelism. Powell (1970), for instance, identifies three
characteristics: a reciprocal exchange of goods and services (his primary characteristic), a
relationship between two parties that are unequal in status, and the proximity of such a
relationship (412). On proximity, he specifies that frequent, face-to-face contact guarantees the
relationship. Powell’s conceptualization is parsimonious but does little to delimit clientelism.
Consider the Latin American compadrazgo wherein parents select a godmother or father to their
child based on a person’s ability to provide necessary resources. This fictive kinship brings
together two unequal parties in a mutually beneficial, long-term relationship; the parents and
child receive resources while the compadres boost their social clout. Though a simple example, it
illustrates the ubiquitous nature of Powell’s characteristics. Following Powell, one should
include the compadrazgo and the patron-client relationship that occurs in the political sphere as
instances of clientelism. In other words, the concept’s extension is too broad: it fails to restore
clientelism’s descriptive power.
Hilgers (2011) creates a concept of clientelism that is not worlds away from Powell’s but
more narrow in its extension. She determines clientelism’s main characteristic as the “interestmaximizing exchange of resources for political support” (2011, 573). Hence, the political
element differentiates clientelism from other patron-client exchanges like the compadrazgo. Her
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secondary characteristics include longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact and status
inequality. These secondary characteristics demonstrate her understanding of clientelism as a
lasting personal relationship in addition to an exchange (573). It seems that this
conceptualization fulfills Sartori’s taxonomical requisites by identifying clientelism. Yet, there
may be a substantial gap between Hilgers’s definition and empirical examples of the
phenomenon. By limiting “conceptually the patron-client relationship to one between two
individuals,” Hilgers aptly describes a clientelist exchange but not clientelism (580). Put
differently, the patron-client relationship and clientelism are not synonymous. 7 The latter
refers—as this paper will demonstrate— to a political system and, in restricting the concept to the
microsociological level of analysis, Hilgers fails to capture this empirical reality.8
Hopkin (2006) presents an alternative conceptualization of clientelism as an “economic
or ‘market’ exchange, in which the client seeks to maximize utility irrespective of any sense of
obligation toward or identification with another actor” (4). He thus places clientelism in the
economic domain and argues that clients enjoy a great deal of autonomy. Consequently, they are
free to shop around with their vote, in search of the best economic return. In contrast, Piattoni
(2001) interprets clientelism as essentially political, albeit with an economic characteristic. At its
core, clientelism is a strategy that patrons use to amass political power and clients to advance
their interests (2). Patron-client relations are “ruled by economic principles” but not economic in

7

Hilgers is certainly not alone in her decision to treat interchangeably the patron-client relationship and
clientelism. Kaufman, for one, agrees that, “Given the difficulties involved in ‘extending’ the clientele concept, it
may well be that we ought to be content with this somewhat modest choice [clientelism as a two-person exchange
relationship] and concentrate comparative research on the relatively narrow arenas from which the concept was
originally drawn” (1974, 302). Unfortunately, not all authors (e.g., Archer 1990; Lemarchand and Legg 1972) are as
conscious of the liberties they exercise when they conceptualize clientelism as a dyadic exchange but use the
concept to explain behavior in a larger unit of analysis (e.g. national political systems). The traditional patron-client
relationship and clientelism may in fact refer to different phenomena, an argument that appears later in this section.
8
Clientelism’s systemic nature is evident in Javier Auyero’s seminal study of the concept, which he
understands as a series of “problem-solving networks” (Auyero 2000b). His rich, ethnographic work details urban
clientelism in the shantytowns of Buenos Aires.
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principle (11). Stokes’s (2011) definition—which arguably best reflects the current
understanding of clientelism—also emphasizes its political essence. In Stokes’s words,
clientelism is “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion
of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?” (649). Her
criterion suggests the excludable nature of clientelist benefits. For Piattoni and Stokes,
clientelism is analogous to an economic exchange but anchored in the political domain;
resources flow from above to realize political agendas. The point here is that the classical
concept structure is valuable because it clarifies clientelism’s crux. Its clarity reveals areas of
disagreement and encourages focused debate on the it. Moreover, the structure itself facilitates
comparison across understandings.
Family Resemblance Conceptualizations
Family resemblance conceptualizations abound in the literature but are perhaps the least
helpful in the specification of clientelism. Most authors argue that clientelism is present in all
states in some form or degree (e.g., Hicken 2011; van de Walle 2007). Therefore, not only is
there ontological disagreement, but the “elements which enter into the definition of clientelism
are liable to vary at any given stage of political development” (Lemarchand and Legg 1972,
158). The resulting level of conceptual stretching leaves one wondering whether there exists a
concept of clientelism at all. If so, it is improbable that the concept would be useful for
systematic comparison of cases.
To be sure, almost all writers on the subject include two characteristics: clientelism is a
contingent exchange between unequal parties.9 One might gather from such consensus that
clientelism, unlike say populism (see Barr 2017, chapter 2), is not an essentially contested
concept. Yet these characteristics leave the analyst with an overwhelming number of empirical
9

More recent work (e.g., Hopkin 2006) calls the element of inequality into question.
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cases: the compadrazgo, employer-employee relationship, and one-off vote buying are all
examples of clientelism under the two characteristics. While contingency and status inequality
appear central for a definition, they delimit little when taken together. One should not, then,
forgo the use of the family resemblance structure for those who, in their conceptualizations,
require the above characteristics. That is, authors may call for these two characteristics and use
the family resemblance structure. Although family resemblance concepts do not necessitate any
single characteristic for membership, the analyst might be better suited—for the concept of
clientelism—by taking the presence of contingency and inequality as starting points. Strict
adherence to this structure’s rules might hinder categorization of significant chunks of the
clientelist literature.
Lemarchand and Legg (1972), for example, use the family resemblance structure to
identify clientelism in feudal, patrimonial, and industrial polities. Despite significant variation in
what patrons and clients exchange and the relationship’s level of affect and formalization, they
deem clientelism present in all three political systems (160-1). Their classification springs from
the single domain of political bargaining and requires that exchanges be between unequal parties
and reciprocal (151). From this point, however, the presence of any three characteristics, the
three being an affective component; the informal nature of the relationship; and the existence of
brokers, signals an instance of clientelism. In other words, it appears that no specific
characteristic is necessary for membership beyond the foundational two. For Lemarchand and
Legg, the affective lord-vassal relationship, in which a lord granted a fief in exchange for the
vassal’s services, is equivalent to the more pragmatic patron-broker-client exchange of selective
benefits for political support. And these transactions, in turn, are not categorically different from
the appointment of administrative and political offices in patrimonial systems for loyalty to a

15
ruler. Furthermore, that lord-vassal relations were of a contractual, institutionalized nature,
whereas clientelism in industrial systems is informal and semilegal, is insufficient reason to
separate the two—both belong to the family of clientelism. Unlike radial advocates, the authors
here do not present a full instance of the phenomenon or allow for ranking of subtypes; feudal
clientelism is not more clientelistic than patrimonial or industrial clientelism. Lemarchand and
Legg instead seek to create a wide-ranging concept.
One could argue that this family resemblance concept is advantageous because it does not
limit clientelism to a historical stage of development. On the other hand, it does not indicate
continuity in the use of the concept over time; rather it presents consequentially different
phenomena under the same group. When used, the family resemblance structure functions to
obscure clientelism more than it reveals. Specifically, it tends to include vote buying, porkbarreling, bribery, corruption, patronage, friendship and machine politics under the family of
clientelism (Hilgers 2011, 572). A misappropriation of public goods and misrepresentation of
citizens usually connect these phenomena. However, in terms of the goals at hand, this structure
does not enhance conceptual clarity.
Radial Conceptualizations
Through the addition of adjectives, radial concept structures present ideal and diminished
varieties of clientelism. Again, the attachment of an adjective reflects the removal of a
characteristic and thus creation of a subtype.10 Fox (1994), for example, notes a shift from
“authoritarian” to “semiclientelism” as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its
hegemonic status in Mexican politics. Authoritarian clientelism functions as the starting point for
his analysis and ideal type. The term refers to “imbalanced bargaining relations [that] require the

10

Radial concepts thus differ from classical ones wherein adjectives add characteristics that a case must
meet to warrant inclusion.
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enduring political subordination of clients and are reinforced by the threat of coercion” (153).
Semiclientelism, by contrast, does not have a coercive aspect; accordingly, the enforcement of
compliance takes a different form under this subtype. Where politicians previously threatened
with sticks, they begin to intimidate via carrots, or the discontinuation of benefits (157). The
transitional category of semiclientelism thereby illustrates the gray area in between authoritarian
clientelism and citizenship. Although politicians no longer threatened the use of force, they
continued to infringe on citizens’ right to associational autonomy, which grants citizens the
ability to organize and defend their interests without fear of punishment. Fox’s ideal and
diminished conceptualizations, then, highlight the role of political domination in the operation of
clientelism. In short, the method of enforcement may change but continue to serve the same
objective, that of control.
Gay (2006), too, utilizes a radial structure when he isolates “thin clientelism” in the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Where clientelism represents the overt exchange of votes for benefits,
its thinner variant delivers these political results in a more implicit manner. The Partido
Democrático Trabalhista (PDT) in particular enjoyed considerable electoral success through the
latter in the 1980s. At this time in the Vidigal favela, for example, there existed an autonomous
neighborhood association bent on eradicating the practice of clientelism from the favela. The
association only accepted public works projects that did not require reciprocation at the ballot
box; furthermore, association leaders invited politicians to weekly meetings to introduce their
ideas, not negotiate with voters (206).11 PDT representatives at meetings discussed public works
sponsored by the party based on need. That is, regarding the distribution of resources, the party
treated favelas equally whether they were PDT strongholds or not. During the meetings

11

Nevertheless, leaders could not thwart individual material transactions between politicians and voters
outside of association meetings.

17
politicians even declared they, “‘wanted nothing in return; these are your rights’” (208). Gay
observes, though, that this was a change in discourse alone—politicians were effectively asking
for votes. And voters, despite the efforts of association leaders, rewarded the PDT with their
votes, unwilling to trust “abstract systems of distribution and justice” (211). The PDT’s strategy
thus resembles clientelism, yet the receipt of benefits did not depend on compliance. Put
differently, thin clientelism suggests that contingency in exchange need not be a functional
characteristic of clientelism and thus actually refers to pork barrel politics.
Although these radial structures elucidate specific cases, they do not contribute to a
definition of clientelism itself. They instead increase the concept’s empirical coverage through
the proselytization of subtypes, which do not allow for direct observation of the phenomenon.
Given the existing plethora of empirical cases, one must question the radial structure’s utility.
The classical concept structure therefore surfaces from this review as the most promising for the
goals of this study. Its clear boundaries illuminate clientelism’s essence and aid in case selection.
However, that classical authors present different core characteristics—through their placement of
clientelism in the economic and political domains—suggests a heretofore unaddressed rift in
understanding. Accompanying this division is a broader debate in the literature regarding the
extent of clientelism. In other words, concerns over more granular aspects such as the numbers
and links necessary to distinguish the concept from others. An exploration of such matters entails
insight into clientelism’s origin story.
Setting up a Political Understanding: Numbers, Links, and Domains
One can trace the conceptual development of clientelism through the disciplines of
anthropology and political science. Anthropologists first termed clientelism as the “analysis of
how persons of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, manipulate
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their relationships in order to attain their ends” (Weingrod 1968, 379). This understanding refers
to a vertical relationship between landlord and peasant, wherein a patron provides clients with
access to basic goods in exchange for services (rent, labor, etc.) and demonstrations of social
loyalty (speaking highly of the patron in public). Political scientists, however, comprehend
clientelism as “the study of how political party leaders seek to turn public institutions and public
resources to their own ends, and how favors of various kinds are exchanged for votes”
(Weingrod 1968, 379). The political interpretation also emphasizes a vertical relationship even
though scholars refer to it as “mass party” or new clientelism (Hopkin 2006, 3). In this version of
the concept, political party leaders replace landlords as patrons and distribute excludable benefits
and resources for votes. One can also understand the transition between old and new clientelism
through the introduction of brokers. In this view, party leaders co-opted landlords to further their
political goals (Mouzelis 1985, 334). Landlords were thus still patrons to clients but not the
overarching patrons; instead, they became part of a broader clientelist chain. Those who use the
classical structure, then, continue to present two types of clientelism: old and new.
Addressing this separation is the first challenge for the student of clientelism, who must
question if it is analytically useful to accommodate both types through the same term. Most
scholars find that old and new are not sufficiently different and therefore one term is satisfactory
(e.g., Archer 1990; Graziano 1976; Mouzelis 1985).12 For the goals of this political study,
though, the typical approach may not be appropriate. The need at hand is for a concept that
allows empirical analysis of clientelism’s resilience in present-day Argentina. Consequently, the
view here is that the new type is “real” clientelism, so to speak, while the traditional variant
refers to a separate phenomenon. Classification as a different entity occurs on the basis of the

12

Archer, for instance, argues that the two types vary in scope, intensity, durability, and types of
transactions but are fundamentally similar (1990, 9). He thus identifies differences in degree, not kind.
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core characteristic, meaning that the two types can—and indeed do—share several secondary
categories.
Consider Hopkin (2006) who places clientelism in the economic domain. He quotes
Gellner (1977) who argues that: “Economic benefits are, at least ideally, calculable,
noncommittal and single-shot: hence, an economic operation is isolable, and does not need to
give rise to any permanent relationship…By contrast, the long-term imponderables which are
being ‘exchanged’ in a political relationship, ipso facto give a much deeper colouring to the links
between the parties to the transaction” (5-6). Hopkin claims that Gellner “draws the distinction
[between new and old clientelism] with striking clarity” (4). The former’s position raises several
important points, including where one draws the line between the types. The literature broadly
understands old clientelism as those patron-client relations that prevailed before state
centralization and the expansion of the market (e.g., Powell 1970, Weingrod 1968). Hopkin does
not deviate explicitly from this norm. Nevertheless, what he terms old clientelism is actually
fairly consistent with general, modern interpretations of the concept; meanwhile, his new version
references distinct phenomena.
For Hopkin, new clientelism does not include the political subordination of clients.
Established scholars, though, would likely take issue with his understanding of the phenomenon.
In new clientelism, the patron’s bargaining power still exceeds that of the client (Powell 1970,
413). Some level of autonomy is intrinsic to any bargaining exchange but, in clientelism, clients
face disproportionately more constraints than patrons (Fox 1994, 153). The fear of punishment,
be it through coercive means or the withdrawal of benefits (as is typical in the present-day), is
characteristic of both types. An emphasis on client autonomy that significantly reduces the

20
relationship’s quotient of asymmetry moves away from clientelism and, in doing so, begins to
reflect a different kind of exchange (Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 152).
Additionally, the Gellner quote more appropriately details ad hoc forms of bargaining
such as acts of vote buying, logrolling, bribery, and cooptation.13 Clientelism, by contrast, is
iterative. Ad hoc bargaining may or may not occur repeatedly, while iteration is a characteristic
of clientelism. Norms-driven scholars attribute its iterative nature to the principle of
generalized—as opposed to balanced—reciprocity. Clientelist exchanges are not of a “tit-for-tat”
sort where patrons specify what they expect in return from clients, and clients are in a position to
reciprocate equally (Wolf 1966, 13). The phenomenon lacks a set measure of exchange and as
such there is “no way to free oneself through payment of an agreed price” (Graziano 1976, 160).
Those who provide interest-oriented accounts observe a commitment issue that is particular to
clientelism (e.g., Magaloni 2014; Stokes 2011). This type of political linkage involves an
ongoing relationship between the two parties; ergo, with the knowledge that the two will meet
again, each side has an incentive to uphold its end of the bargain. Without digressing too far into
the mechanics of clientelism, these examples demonstrate that scholars of different persuasions
from both types (old and new) identify iteration as a characteristic.
Having established asymmetry and iteration as secondary characteristics of clientelism in
general, one is in a position to differentiate the two types by analyzing their core characteristics.
Though Hopkin deems new clientelism economic in nature, it seems that most scholars
conceptualize its predecessor through the economic lens (e.g., Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980;
Medina and Stokes 2007).14 In a pre-mercantile context, clients relied almost exclusively on
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To be sure, ad hoc bargaining, too, is inherently political. The one-off nature of such bargaining does not
place it in the economic domain either. Policy based distribution can be ad hoc or iterative.
14
For an opposing view, see Graziano who argues that the traditional version of the concept was political
(1976, 161).
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patrons for the distribution of resources (Piattoni 2001, 12). Market expansion and state
centralization nevertheless threatened the monopolies of patrons and presented a political
opportunity (Mouzelis 1985, 333). Powell (1970) ably underscores the seizure of such an
opportunity by Italian and Venezuelan political parties:
Unlike simple patron-client relations, or primitive clientele systems, the Italian and
Venezuelan networks have been purposively organized from above, endure in
institutionalized form, exchange a wide range of goods and services, and provide quite
lengthy chains of linkages—from the peasant to the President or Prime Minister. They
are, in a quite specific sense, politically representative. (418; emphasis added)
Powell’s point stresses a political intentionality unique to modern clientelism. Unlike traditional
patron-client relations—such as the compadrazgo, wherein patrons or clients could initiate the
relationship—political actors organize clientelism from above in the new type.
Powell also alludes to networks and various linkages, which are not present in the
concept’s traditional use but are essential to distinguishing old from new. The aforementioned
brokers or intermediaries are comparatively autonomous individuals in that they do not obtain
their authority from national political leaders (Mouzelis 1985, 343). Their existence can call into
question the legitimacy of political elites, as clients are most loyal to brokers, not politicians.
Accordingly, obligations to mobilize become weaker the further one moves from the original
dyadic relationship (Landé 1983, 442).15 The introduction of brokers hence creates new
opportunities for control while maintaining the element of personalism that is a hallmark of the
dyadic exchange. Brokers facilitate the extension of clientelism and thereby accommodation of
greater numbers into politics. One can still observe the dyad in new clientelism, but this twoperson behavioral system no longer entirely encapsulates reality. The old patron-client relation
now occurs in a broader network or system of such dyads, and this change has important
15

Archer describes the negative consequences of this transition to broker-mediated clientelism for
Colombian state capacity. The point being that a change in the rules of the game—that is, form— changed the
outcome as well (1990, 35-7). One must then learn the new rules to continue playing the game.
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conceptual repercussions. Scholars tend to detail a dyadic relationship but then transpose the
concept to explain political behavior at the national level. Kaufman (1974) names this the “level
of analysis problem” and its fundamental implication is that, by failing to adapt the concept to
their phenomenon of interest, political scientists are unable to explore the answers to their
questions. Although the temptation to conceptualize clientelism as a dyadic exchange is
understandable, the patron-client concept is usually invalid for the goals of political science.
This review of domains, numbers, and links leads one to wonder whether the literature
goes far enough by separating the phenomenon into two distinct types (old and new). Indeed,
closer examination reveals substantive differences in domain. Old clientelism represents the
economic domain, whereas new clientelism is political.16 The former concerns the distribution of
resources; the latter revolves around the struggle for power. Earlier forms of clientelism were, in
other words, more strictly material than those observed in the present day where economic
transactions are a characteristic—but not the essence—of clientelism. Simply put, material
transactions in new clientelism are a means to a political end. And this end involves significantly
more clients and hierarchical steps. These differences raise a question: do the conceptual
divisions at hand concern old and new, or thing one and thing two? It is likely that the second
perspective is more suited for this study.
A Definition Emerges
The preceding review of concept structures and domains now informs my definition of
the phenomenon: clientelism is a system that involves personal and iterative exchanges of
selective benefits between unequal actors for political support. In defining it, I utilize the
classical concept structure together with a single, political domain. One can best understand
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Others have not explicitly made this argument but consider that several notable authors refer to the newer
version as political clientelism (e.g., Landé 1983; Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Magaloni 2014; Stokes 2011).
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clientelism through the classical structure, because this type sets clear boundaries for inclusion
and exclusion of cases. Given the lack of conceptual precision, the literature on clientelism
benefits most from the clarity classical concepts provide. On domain, this review maintains that
the it cannot be simultaneously economic and political. The political intentionality of modern
clientelism suggests that it is more than a new manifestation of old behavior. It is instead a
different concept—the actual clientelism—and belongs in the political domain. My definition
specifies five secondary characteristics: personalism, iteration, contingency, status inequality,
and a systemic makeup. The classical structure requires the presence of all five characteristics for
an instance of the concept, and one finds that the five are intimately related. Personalism and
iteration, for instance, ensure contingency by serving as monitoring mechanisms. Brokers
develop relationships with clients and collect information on their political behavior, from
attendance at rallies to voting choices. If clients believe that brokers are monitoring, they are
likely to exhibit the desired behavior. Again, pragmatic concerns explain my evaluation of the
concept’s characteristics. In this case, the interest lies in understanding clientelism in a political
light, leading me to make a few basic assumptions. Iteration and contingency allow politicians—
or self-interested actors, who seek more, not less, power—to distribute resources judiciously.
They reward those clients who support them and punish those who do not. An inability to
withhold benefits means that politicians would be giving away resources with no return and such
a strategy is inconsistent with the typical politician’s goals. Lastly, inequality is a familiar trait
for the student of clientelism, who detects the trait in virtually every empirical case.
The definition I propose differs from those in the extant literature in two important ways.
First, clientelism is a strategy politicians use to obtain and maintain power. It is, therefore, not
inherent but manufactured and dependent on the flow of resources. Second, its iterative and
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systemic nature is essential in distinguishing it from other potentially related concepts.
Clientelism refers to multiple personal and contingent exchanges at different levels of the
political food chain. At each level, one must ask whether the exchange is isolated. If so, then
clientelism is not at play. Other political science works emphasize that clientelism is personal,
discretionary, and typically occurs between unequal actors (e.g. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007;
Stokes 2011). Though helpful, these conceptualizations do not go far enough in identifying the
phenomenon. My inclusion of iteration as a characteristic indicates that clientelism refers to a
broader system of exchanges. This understanding helps to differentiate the concept from one-off
exchanges such as vote buying. In doing so, my definition increases conceptual precision,
placing the discipline of political science in a better position to address clientelism and its
associated ills.
III.

Literature Review
An understanding of clientelism also helps one sift through the vast literature on the

subject. Given clientelism’s important implications for the quality of democracy, what factors
explain its emergence and decline? The following section reviews the literature on the causal
factors of clientelism, paying special attention to international and subnational variation.
On Mechanisms: Establishing a Framework
Underlying my reading of the literature is the observation that mechanisms matter. One
must study how clientelism works before commenting on why it continues to thrive. In fact,
explanations of resilience may be inseparable from the phenomenon’s inner workings:
clientelism persists, in part, because it works so well. Simply put, the question of how must
precede that of why. A literature review on this topic that fails to contextualize the causal factors
is incomplete. Toward that end, I group the literature into two main categories (instrumental and
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obligatory), which reflect the logic of clientelism from the voter’s perspective.17 In doing so, I
anchor the schools of thought in their broader theoretical assumptions. This step will aid in my
eventual evaluation of the literature’s strengths and weaknesses.
Clientelism succeeds when citizens exchange their political allegiance for goods and
services. Such allegiance takes the form of attendance at party rallies, campaigning on behalf of
parties, and, most commonly, voting in favor of the party that distributed benefits. This last type
of political behavior is of particular interest to the present study, given that the ballot box is the
ultimate test of clientelism’s efficacy as an electoral strategy. In addition, it functions as the lever
through which clientelism directly impacts the quality of democracy (Weitz-Shapiro 2014, 40).
Furthermore, controversy over the voting behavior of clients defines the divisions in the
literature on this topic. The secret ballot presents the opportunity to defect: clients can accept
material goods and proceed to vote according to their actual preferences. Yet, empirical evidence
shows that clients honor their commitments (e.g., Brusco et al. 2004). Scholars offer competing
explanations for this observed accountability at the micro-level of analysis.18 And this
accountability, in turn, is worthy of study because of the suspected role it plays in sustaining
clientelism.
Political scientists have diligently developed the instrumental approach since the
resurgence of interest in clientelism (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001; Stokes et
al. 2013). This approach assumes that patrons and clients are rational actors. They weigh the
costs and benefits of clientelist exchanges and engage in goal oriented behavior. Clients
understand that their continued access to material benefits is contingent upon their return of the
17

Some may question my framework but even those who present macro-level arguments note that microdecisions can overwhelm and change them (Piattoni 2001, 2). Thus, attention to the micro-level is necessary.
18
The scenario here holds macro-level factors constant for now; namely, the flow of resources and
politicians’ access to these resources. Put differently, it assumes that resources flow freely or there exists the
possibility for them to do so. Reception of benefits, then, depends on individual voting behavior alone.
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favor at the ballot box. In the instrumentalist tradition, fear is the mechanism for client
compliance. Consequently, clients believe that politicians or brokers monitor their political
behavior. An assumption on the part of instrumental politicians is that clients value material
benefits over the ability to express their genuine political views.
Despite the instrumentalist view’s dominance, the obligatory approach may also shed
light on the maintenance of the clientelist relationship (e.g., Landini 2013; Lawson and Greene
2014; Wolf 1966). According to this approach, client behavior observes a different set of rules
but is not necessarily irrational (O’Donnell 1996, 40). The main assumption here is that clients
who receive goods and services feel an obligation to their patrons. And they resolve that sense of
obligation through political support of their benefactors. Therefore, reciprocity governs the
obligatory approach. Clients self-monitor, meaning that the guaranteeing mechanism is internal
not external. An additional distinction to note is that clients vote retrospectively. Unlike
instrumentalists, these scholars argue that clients vote according to previous experiences
(positive and negative) with patrons. Since the mechanisms of clientelism function as a fault
line—or a fundamental set of assumptions from which all other work follows—in existing
scholarship, clarity on these mechanisms puts one in a better position to categorize the literature.
Variation in Clientelism: the Leading Explanations
Three streams of research explain variation in the presence of clientelism: the cultural,
historical institutional, and structural approaches. While topical, the first two approaches are no
longer at the center of scholarly debate and do not seem particularly conducive to my research
goals; thus, I do not devote a great deal of attention to them. The bulk of this review focuses
instead on the remaining school, which appears ripe for hypothesis development. Numerous
works defy categorization and adopt several of the aforementioned perspectives. To maximize
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clarity, I discuss below those works and authors that define each approach. I also acknowledge,
though, that clientelism is a complex phenomenon and one should not sacrifice accuracy for
clarity. As such, I note overlap in schools of thought where it exists.
Sociologists tend to argue the cultural perspective that collective identity and norms
sustain clientelism. In other words, distribution of material resources, while necessary, is an
insufficient condition. Javier Auyero’s ethnographic fieldwork in the outskirts of Buenos Aires
figures prominently in this school (e.g., 2000a, 2000b). From the client’s point of view, he finds
that clientelism persists as a dynamic “structure of feeling” that is rooted in Peronist imagery
(2000b, 213-4). Such imagery confers legitimacy on clientelist networks so that they become
independent of changes in brokers and patrons (2000a, 73-4). The language of commitments
matters as well. A study of clientelist discourse reveals the prevalence of expressions such as the
“given word” and “integrity” (Roniger 2012, 37). Roniger plainly states: “whoever tries to
undermine clientelism addressing just a change in the formal ‘rules of the game’ without
addressing such embedded cultural idioms will likely fail to eradicate it” (2012, 37). These
idioms point to the importance of individual honor in a collective. Those scholars who continue
to work in this tradition, however, recognize that cultural norms alone cannot account for the
variability of clientelism. Yet, as I will later demonstrate, this camp in the literature remains
relevant and serves as inspiration for the burgeoning psychological camp.
Martin Shefter (1977) led the historical institutional approach with his contributions on
bureaucratic professionalization and the role of formal democratic institutions. Specifically, his
explanation emphasizes the interaction of state formation, industrialization, and enfranchisement.
A state that professionalized its bureaucracy prior to democratization was less susceptible to
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clientelism.19 Professionalization guarded against the distribution of the spoils of power by the
victorious party. That is, parties’ inability to court voters with administrative positions forced
them to resort to programmatic appeals. Meanwhile, external parties, or those not in power,
attracted disenfranchised citizens through programmatic appeals as well. Shefter observes that
the latter relied on programmatic appeals because they too could not access state resources. To
be clear, their lack of access was due to their distance from the political system. These parties
consistently bypassed clientelism because it was not an option. Alternatively, variation exists in
internal parties where constraints were institutional in nature. Those internal parties in states
without an independent bureaucracy seized the clientelist opportunity. Thus, per historical
institutionalism, institutional differences account for variation in the presence of clientelism
across and within states.
Critics of the historical institutional school assert that it is problematically one-sided and
contradicts empirical findings. On the former, recent works indicate an emerging consensus
regarding the explication of clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Morgan 2011, Piattoni
2001). The works frame clientelism in supply and demand terms wherein patrons represent
supply and clients demand. Addressing each factor and the interaction of the two allows for a
more accurate explanation. Shefter essentially argues that supply side factors alone account for
clientelism; researchers need not attend to voter preferences or characteristics of the electorate.
As a result, he overly simplifies clientelism and thus effectively captures only one side of the
phenomenon (Piattoni 2001, 17). An emphasis on institutions, moreover, may reflect a lack of
appreciation for clientelism as a political strategy. Patrons and clients choose clientelism to
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Although they are not synonymous, the literature uses the terms clientelism and patronage
interchangeably. The latter typically refers to the exchange of public employment for political support. Hence, one
can conceive of patronage as a subtype, or more limited form, of clientelism. It may be useful for the reader to keep
this nuance in mind to evaluate Shefter’s argument, which he bases on observations of patronage politics.
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maximize their interests. The case for choice over constraint is evident in the example of the
French MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) and Italian DC (Democrazia Cristiana). In the
years following World War II, these Christian Democratic parties sought to appeal to a wide
array of voters but differed in their goals. MRP set out to reform French society, while DC
concentrated on keeping communism at bay. Both parties operated in comparable institutional
contexts in which clientelism was a viable option. However, only DC pursued the clientelist
linkage. Having assessed internal demand—alongside their own goals—politicians chose to meet
it differently (Warner 2007, 123). Ergo, institutions and historical conditions may influence, but
not cause, clientelism; it may be inappropriate to assume that institutions act as constraints on
actors’ behavior (Piattoni 2001, 18).
Other historical case studies suggest that institutional constraint and individual choice are
responsible for the observed outcome. A comparison of clientelism in Great Britain and the
United States, for example, isolates American federalism as chief among explanations for why
clientelism was more resilient in the U.S. (Stokes et al. 2013, ch. 8). In Britain, the 1883 British
Anti-Corrupt Practices Act successfully curtailed clientelism through the introduction of
restrictions on campaign spending. The U.S., on the other hand, took considerably longer to
introduce similar reforms.20 Independent state parties and courts constrained the central
government in the U.S., thereby acting as obstacles to antimachine reforms (Stokes et al. 2013,
205). Federalism essentially created 48 collective action problems. Nevertheless, party leaders
themselves eventually pushed for reforms, dismantling their political machines.21 Unlike the
French and Italian example, this case emphasizes institutional context but also recognizes
individual choice. Consequently, the role of institutions remains unclear.
20

See Stokes et al. pages 240-1 for examples of U.S. reforms.
Structural factors (e.g. expansion of the electorate) decreased the utility of clientelism for politicians,
incentivizing them to reform existing institutions.
21
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The structural school presents two main variables: political competition and economic
development. Structuralists, or developmentalists as they are also named in the literature, argue
that, as countries modernize, these variables increase and make clientelism less likely22;
therefore, states can outgrow clientelism, so to speak. The logic is relatively straightforward: for
clientelism to function, politicians must have access to resources, and levels of economic
development determine the extent of available resources. States at the lower end of development
engage in prebendal clientelism, which sees politicians distribute the few available resources
among ethnic elites (van de Walle 2007). Clientelism is usually absent in highly developed
states, where voters enjoy a certain level of economic autonomy (Magaloni et al. 2007, 187).
Their independence makes them more likely to reject clientelism in favor of programmatic
distribution.23 In contrast, one tends to find full instances of clientelism at the intermediate stage
of development where the conditions for patronage politics are opportune from a political
perspective. By conditions, these authors refer to the balance between economic development
and political competition. Politicians have enough funds at their discretion to finance clientelism
and the economic status of the electorate allows them to do so. Political competition, too, is not
yet so stiff that clientelism becomes more expensive than programmatic distribution. Rebecca
Weitz-Shapiro (2014) posits a promising developmental argument, which clarifies the interaction
of these two variables. She demonstrates that politicians reject clientelism in the face of high
levels of political competition and a sizeable middle class (14). The former subjects politicians to
the latter’s preferences. However, if voters are mostly poor and political competition for this
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To be sure, the relationship is not linear, as I discuss below.
Middle class voters tend to reject clientelism for two reasons: 1) it prevents the government from
investing in more substantial methods of constituency service (e.g., infrastructure and security), and 2) is morally
reprehensible. The distinction of note here is the first reason; nonpoor voters—because of their economic status—
stand to gain from considerable material benefits. Poor voters can also deem clientelism problematic in a moral
sense. Still, their immediate material needs make such concerns a luxury (Weitz-Shapiro 2014, 12-3 and 41).
23
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subaltern group is high, then clientelism is likely. As a strategy, clientelism generates “audience
costs” or electoral tradeoffs (53). It is not appropriate for every constituency and politicians
know as such.
In general, this school posits that market-oriented reforms threaten clientelism. Yet
Levitsky (2007) provides compelling evidence of the contrary. In the Latin American context,
neoliberal reforms acted as an opportunity to strengthen clientelist linkages. The growth of
widespread urban poverty in Latin America outpaced the emergence of the middle class, making
clientelism a viable strategy. The urban poor preferred concrete benefits over ideological or
programmatic appeals, while the middle class responded to more professional electoral strategies
(217). Since the middle class was in the electoral minority, parties were able to adopt both
strategies. Levitsky’s findings thus suggest that this structural perspective fails to capture
clientelism’s transformative properties. Political competition and economic development are
certainly important factors in the persistence of clientelism but fail to fully explain empirical
reality.
Leading structuralists continue to recognize the importance of these two main variables,
albeit with slightly different approaches. According to Morgan (2011), whose cogent argument is
worthy of careful examination, the clientelist system decays when demand outstrips supply. On
the demand side, she posits that social transformation and political decentralization explain the
rise and fall of clientelism. Increases in population, immigration, poverty, and the size of the
electorate account for social transformation. Such changes increase the number of voters seeking
clientelist benefits. Furthermore, decentralization leads to an increase in elections at the
subnational level.24 Taken together, the implication of these demand side factors is that political
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Subnational elections make local patrons more independent, and therefore less responsive, to the national
party. From the party’s point of view, then, it expends more resources but receives fewer rewards.
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parties must play the clientelist game more frequently with a greater number of players (61-5).
Supply side factors include economic conditions and parties’ access to state resources. Economic
crises constrain resources thereby making it harder to sustain the clientelist linkage. Regarding
access, professionalization of the bureaucracy, neoliberalism, and limits to a parties’ ability to
monitor also decrease the likelihood of clientelism. If one party cannot maintain clientelism, then
clients will look to other parties for benefits. In the case that those parties also cannot meet
demand, clientelism disappears (66).
Stokes et al. (2013) present many of the same structural factors but evaluate them through
their broker-mediated model. Population growth, for instance, makes it more difficult for brokers
to monitor individual voters. To adapt, parties must hire more brokers—i.e. bear an additional
cost associated with the clientelist strategy. When it becomes less costly to communicate directly
with voters, politicians will favor a return to programmatic politics. Stated succinctly, Stokes et
al. argue that macro-changes affect broker efficiency, which in turn makes clientelism more or
less attractive to parties. Given that brokers are imperfect agents to begin with, specific structural
changes may exacerbate their flawed nature.25 At a certain point, it is in the parties’ interest to
cut out the middleman. Despite these substantial and varied contributions, the structural school
essentially offers one answer to my question: that political competition explains variation in
clientelism.
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Examples of broker imperfection include high levels of rent seeking and inefficient targeting of voters;
see Stokes et al., chapter 3.
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Evaluation of the Literature
The competition hypothesis appears to be the most relevant and testable hypothesis in the
literature. Notably absent from my review, however, is a discussion on electoral institutions.26
Although some in the clientelist literature insist on their importance (e.g. Taylor-Robinson 2006,
108-10), others deny that such institutions play a role (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 42;
Müller 2007). Given that clientelism is an informal institution, an examination of formal
institutions does not appear fruitful. Moreover, the electoral institutional approach suffers from
an endogeneity problem. It is unclear whether causation stems from behavior or institutions
(Weyland 2002, 68). To this end, politicians may modify institutions in their favor (Piattoni
2001, 18). Brazilian politicians, for instance, advocated open-list proportional representation to
facilitate their reliance on clientelism at local levels (Mainwaring 1999, 258). In this case, prior
patterns of behavior account for the dependent variable. More importantly, a consideration of
electoral institutions seems inappropriate for the present study, since, by adopting a subnational
approach, I hold institutions mostly constant. This thesis proceeds under the standard assumption
that clientelism works in an instrumental, or rational, manner. There is certainly a healthy
amount of debate on the issue but to engage further would be to adopt a different, additional
research question (See Appendix A).
IV.

Overview of Empirical Study
The goal here is to explain the conditions under which politicians, in this case President

Menem (1989-1999) and his administration, choose the clientelist strategy. The empirical
literature offers several indirect indicators of clientelism, with the most common revolving
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Electoral institutions typically fall under rational choice institutionalism (RCI). Thus, they differ from
historical institutionalism wherein institutions are assigned a historical, not functional, role. RCI moves from
individuals to institutions, whereas historical institutionalism operates in the reverse order.
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around measures of the extent of the public sector (Hicken 2011, 304).27 Specifically, scholars
have used public employment and the size of construction budgets to identify clientelism
(Kitschelt et al. 2009, 745). Since these are imperfect indicators at best—and I am hindered to
some extent by data availability issues28—I will rely on cases of the concept that the literature
agrees represent clientelism. Doing so is appropriate for my purposes given the richness of the
clientelism literature on Argentina during the neoliberal turn. Levitsky’s (2003) influential study
of Argentina’s Justicialista Party (PJ) accordingly informs much of this work.
The party of famed populist Juan Perón, who led the PJ from its creation in the mid1940s to his death in 1974, is notorious for its support of labor unions and the working class.
Though scholars (e.g., Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2003; Stokes 2005) most closely associate the PJ
with the use of clientelism in Argentina, it is worth noting that the Radical Civic Union (UCR),
the other major party whose base consists of the wealthy classes and business community,
pursued the strategy—albeit perhaps unintentionally—during the Alfonsín administration (198389). Specifically, Congress approved the National Food Plan (PAN) to improve living conditions
in the face of the debt crisis. Alfonsín and his ministers designed PAN as a nondiscretionary,
need-based program. It even operated through an aligned government structure to—in the words
of Aldo Neri, Alfonsín’s minister of health and social welfare—“bypass the heavy state
bureaucracy and make it more transparent” (Garay 2017, 107). In practice, though, PAN’s
implementation was highly clientelist as the provinces intervened, expressing concern that a
nationally operated program would challenge provincial authority. Alfonsín caved to provincial
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These quantitative indicators supplement ethnographic fieldwork and survey research, which represent
the standard approaches to the study of the phenomenon.
28
Szwarcberg (2013), for example, tests for the presence of clientelism by observing whether party
activists took voter attendance at rallies. Her measure hence determines contingency, a core characteristic of the
concept. In the absence of such data for my time period of interest, I look to the literature for alternative measures
and assessments.
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governments and allowed governors to appoint half of the PAN agents, who controlled access to
food and other nutrition benefits. The lack of systematic data to assess need meant that municipal
governments themselves collected information from which they selected beneficiaries. At a
greater level of specificity, PAN agents typically identified beneficiaries and thus the agents
were, essentially, brokers (Grassi et al. 1994, 194-5). In sum, clientelism was present in
Argentina before Menem’s embrace of neoliberalism. And I find that politicians continued to
select the strategy throughout Menem’s presidency, despite the significant change in
circumstances brought on by neoliberalism (See Table 1).
Table 1. Overview of Variables
Cases
Variables

Resilience I
1989-1991
Present

Resilience II
1992-1995
Present

1996-1999
Present
Party insider-Lame
ducka
Moderate-high

Clientelism
Menem’s relationship
Party adherent
Party insider
to the Peronist party
Electoral competition
Low
Low-moderate
Notes: a Menem achieved lame duck status in July 1998 when he announced that he would not seek reelection in

1999. Until then, he was a significant force in party politics (Levitsky 2003, 176), and some argue his announcement
did not alter his vote-seeking logic as he declared that he would run again in 2003 (Weitz-Shapiro 2006, 134).
Menem did in fact seek the presidency that year.

V.

Methodology
On independent variables, this thesis pays special attention to the impact of economic

conditions on a) political competition as well as b) the PJ’s affinity for Menem, and how these
two factors in turn explain his reliance on clientelism. More formally, the two variables manifest
themselves in the following hypotheses:
H1: As political competition increases, clientelism decreases.
H2: Executive leaders are more likely to select clientelism when in a dominant position
relative to their party.

36
The first hypothesis comes from the literature, whereas my conceptualization inspires the second.
Though resources flow from above, clientelism’s systemic essence suggests that power may be
concentrated at certain levels in the political food chain at different points in time. These shifts in
power may, therefore, explain the persistence of clientelism. When power lies with the
executive, he decides whether to pursue clientelism based on a series of structural conditions
(competition, resource availability, future political goals, etc.); if the executive finds himself in a
difficult political situation, but has previously released clientelist benefits, his intermediaries no
longer have a reason to remain loyal and can leverage their remaining clientelist resources
against the executive. In this second scenario, clientelism sustains itself for the time being in a
more decentralized manner.
I measure political competition by the number of political parties in the Argentine party
system and changes in the percentage of the total vote for each party. Regarding Menem’s
relationship to the PJ, I track changes in Menem’s political fortunes which I use to assess
Menem’s freedom to pursue clientelism independent of the PJ. I treat clientelism and Menem’s
relationship to the party as nominal variables, while competition is ordinal. A limitation of the
former is that I am unable to capture differences in the degree of these variables from 1989 to
1999, settling instead for the presence or absence of clientelism and Menem’s categorical
proximity to the party. I nevertheless observe other qualitative changes, like personnel shifts in
machine organizations, related to the dependent variable.
My method of choice in the testing of these hypotheses is process tracing, a tool of
qualitative analysis that emphasizes the order of events to evaluate causal claims (George and
Bennett 2005, chapter 10). Statements from politicians, electoral results, and economic figures
constitute the majority of my data. With this data, I conduct straw-in-the-wind tests to assess the
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validity of each hypothesis. Passing straw-in-the-wind tests affirms the pertinence of the
hypothesis under study and marginally weakens competing hypotheses (Collier 2011, 826; See
Appendix B). This type of test requires the least number of assumptions regarding the
relationship between the available data and my causal inferences. As such, it seems to be the
most appropriate test at this stage of the research.
I explore the hypotheses through three case studies within Menem’s presidency: 198991, 1992-95, and 1996-99. Each case study coincides with a marked shift in economic conditions
and Menem’s political fortunes, while clientelism persists.29 For instance, 1989 saw Menem
perform a bait-and-switch with his embrace of neoliberalism. By 1991, the hyperinflationary
crisis had passed and the economy stabilized; consequently, citizens rewarded the Peronist party
handsomely in midterm elections. In 1994, though, Argentina experienced another economic
recession due to the strong devaluation of the Mexican peso. Menem was reelected in 1995 but
struggled to realize his agenda from this point forward, significantly constrained by the very
policies he implemented in his first term. The case studies allow for variation in clientelism and
economic conditions yet hold the main actor (Menem) and other potential variables, such as
country differences, constant. Argentina makes for quite an interesting case study given my
question as it experienced the most drastic and rapid neoliberal turn in a fully democratic context
(Levitsky and Murillo 2005). The downside, of course, is a concern about Argentina’s
exceptionalism and thus the generalizability of these findings.

29

In Argentina, the economy tends to have an outsized role in the functioning of political institutions (see
Chen 2014).
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VI.

Case Studies

1989-1991: From Peronism without Peron to Peronism without Peronism
With no authority to his name, Raul Alfonsín pushed Menem to assume the presidency
five months ahead of schedule in July 1989. The Argentine economy was in shambles and
hyperinflation neared 200% (Treisman 2003, 94). Despite Menem’s traditional, Peronist
electoral platform that advocated for a “productive revolution” and salariazo (substantial wage
increase), he pursued a drastically different platform once in office (Smith 1991). Evidence of
this came early when Menem appointed non-Peronists to his cabinet and other positions of
significance. His selection of Miguel Roig as economic minister was of particular interest. Roig
worked previously as an executive for the multinational firm Bunge & Born and, after Roig’s
sudden death, Menem appointed Nestor Rapanelli, another Bunge & Born executive. Menem’s
Peronist label was apparently quite fluid. And he was acutely aware that a) his high-level
appointments signaled a break from Peronism, and b) this fact would likely have political
repercussions (Armijo 1994). He even remarked on the former, “there is a joke going around that
says the only Peronist that infiltrated the government is me” (Drosdoff 1989). He resolved to end
the crisis but warned Argentines of “major surgery without anesthesia” (Smith 1991, 53).
True to his word, Peronist legislators approved two extensive bills by September 1989:
the Economic Emergency Law and the State Reform Law. These bills swapped the statist,
import-substitution economic model for one that was market-oriented, privatizing nearly all
state-owned enterprises and cutting around 700,000 jobs from the state bureaucracy (Levitsky
2003, 145-6). Yet the bills, along with several other economic plans (e.g., Plan Bonex, Erman
III-VI), provided only short-term economic stabilization. Hyperinflation returned in 1990 and
only abated with new Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo’s Convertibility Plan in 1991,
wherein the Argentine peso became freely convertible with the dollar (Smith 1991, 63).
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Confronted with a severe hyperinflationary crisis, Menem and Argentines alike spent the 198991 years in an extremely difficult political situation (Weyland 2002, 101-14). In short, the crisis
incentivized politicians and citizens to adopt risk-acceptant strategies.
Levitsky (2003, chapter 5) argues convincingly that the PJ’s deunionization and the
subsequent rise of machine politics occurred before Menem became president. In other words,
the organizational changes necessary to facilitate clientelism had already taken place. As this
section demonstrates, Menem and the PJ strengthened the clientelist linkage in the 1989-91
period, but their investment was not new or radical; the party was already moving toward
clientelism before Menem’s neoliberal turn. Menem bolstered the PJ’s reliance on clientelism
once in office in discrete ways. In 1989, for instance, he appointed Carlos Grosso—president of
the local PJ in the Federal Capital—as mayor of Buenos Aires city. Grosso began to build a
patronage network in 1985 after his election. He then expanded and consolidated this network, or
the “System” as it was known, in his mayoral role until 1992 when he resigned due to corruption
charges. By then, however, Grosso’s punteros ran nearly all of the city’s base units, solidifying
the dominance of clientelism within the PJ in the city of Buenos Aires (Levitsky 2003, 126).
It mattered not to the PJ—which criticized the UCR heavily for PAN’s discretionary
nature—that Alfonsín sought to create a transparent large-scale program to assist with growing
poverty rates. Yet, once in power, Menem delivered more of the same for a short time in the
form of the Solidary Bonus (BS). He established the equally clientelist program through a
presidential decree of emergency. (Such decrees were his modus operandi, especially in the first
three years of his presidency.) BS was a national food stamp program, which provided vouchers
for food and medicine up to half a minimum wage for those families earning less than the
minimum wage. Menem launched BS in a few provinces but soon separated himself from the
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program when PJ senators rejected the proposal. Their criticisms were consistent with those
regarding PAN: BS was problematic because it infringed on the provinces and was a poster child
of clientelism—a simply inappropriate strategy (Garay 2017, 108). The Congress eventually
approved a more limited and short-term version of the BS, but Menem did not push the program.
He instead stated that a new workfare program, Plan Trabajar (Work Plan), would soon replace
BS. Unlike under BS, municipalities would run the Work Plan entirely. And while the former
indeed dissipated, the implementation of the Work Plan occurred later in the Menem
administration; I therefore return to Plan Trabajar in the final case study.
It seems obvious enough that the PJ would denounce PAN as clientelist in an effort to
tarnish the UCR. Less clear, however, is why Peronist governors and senators would criticize
BS, a plan put forward by their president. One must wonder whether the PJ’s initial criticism
stemmed from concern over the presence of clientelism or frustration over the insufficient degree
thereof. Put differently, BS was not clientelist enough that the PJ governors saw themselves in it;
the plan, to them, may not have included enough provincial involvement. If Alfonsín
compromised with the PJ regarding the appointment of PAN agents (half by federal government
and the rest provincial appointees), maybe the PJ expected steeper concessions from Menem.
And perhaps Menem was unwilling to bend to the party’s wishes but also not yet in a position to
assert his agenda. His political fortunes—and thus his relationship to the party—changed after
his successful resolution of the hyperinflationary crisis. The second case study demonstrates how
Menem used his new political capital to invest in clientelism.
1992-1995: Menem’s Prime Time
Economic stabilization in April 1991 significantly improved Menem’s political fortunes.
Inflation fell from a yearly average of 1,344 percent in 1990 to 17.5 percent in 1992; by 1994, it
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registered at 3.9 percent. Furthermore, poverty in the Metropolitan Region of Buenos Aires
decreased substantially from 47.4 percent in October 1989 to 21.6 percent by October of 1991
and 16.1 percent in May 1994 (Weyland 2002, 158). The PJ’s resounding electoral victories in
the midterm elections of 1991 and 1993 particularly emboldened Menem, serving as referenda
on his handling of the crisis (Levitsky and Murillo 2005, 35). Yet in these years of his
presidency, Menem did not forge forward with economic reform; instead, he elected to preserve
the status quo through two fiscal pacts, constitutional revisions, and clientelism. Economic
stabilization motivated the fiscal pacts, as Menem realized that an increase in federal tax
revenues would result in more substantial provincial transfers—potentially threatening the
current economic situation. A 1987 coparticipation law set aside 57 percent of revenues for the
provinces. The fiscal pact of 1992 altered this arrangement by reserving 15 percent of revenues
for the national social security system. In exchange for such a concession from the provinces,
Menem agreed to a minimum floor for provincial transfers irrespective of revenue levels (Eaton
2005, 97-8). 1993 saw Menem inflict additional losses on the provinces with the second pact
restricting governors’ ability to tax businesses (Gordin 2006, 269-70).
The 1994 constitution, though, was arguably Menem’s greatest personal achievement.
Negotiated by Menem and Alfonsín the previous year as the Olivos Pact, it allowed Menem to
run for reelection in 1995. Menem’s priorities after the crisis, therefore, reflect a president
interested in living life above zero (Weyland 2002, 159). His personal political survival no
longer immediately tied to economic reform, Menem positioned himself to enjoy the fruits of his
labor.
One continues to observe clientelism between 1992 and 1995 despite a series of
personnel changes. In fact, clientelism may have become the PJ’s primary linkage during these
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years. Though Grosso resigned in 1992, for instance, the System—and thus clientelism—
persisted in Buenos Aires under Menem-appointed mayors Saúl Bouer and Jorge Domínguez
(Levitsky 2003, 126-7).30 Vice President Eduardo Duhalde also took on a new role, leaving the
vice presidency for the governorship of Buenos Aires in December 1991. Duhalde disagreed
with Menem’s approach to the economic crisis and expected him to move toward statist
economic policies after the crisis abated (Palermo and Novaro 1996, 269). While Menem
appeared to reward Duhalde with the Conurbano Reparation Fund (FRHC) in 1992, a closer look
at the fund’s negotiations reveals a pair with competing political ambitions. Bonvecchi and
Lodola (2010, 203) reference “anecdotal evidence” which illustrates that Menem and Duhalde
negotiated the FRHC on the condition that Duhalde would not run for president in 1995, thereby
solidifying Menem’s chances of reelection.
The Fund directed 10 percent of federal income tax revenues to Greater Buenos Aires for
the funding of social policy programs. Duhalde managed the funds in an outright clientelist
manner, prioritizing those mayors who supported him and building a robust machine known as
the Duhaldista (Levitsky 128-9). The funds, moreover, constituted an ever-increasing amount of
the provincial GDP, with 4.4 percent in 1992, 7.8 percent in 1993, 9.5 percent in 1994, and 10.6
percent the following year (Bonvecchi and Lodola 2010, 195). Overall, the FRHC financed over
twelve hundred social policy projects at a cost of $1.6 billion from 1992 to 1995. Former
provincial senator José Maria Rocca noted that this control over resources created a situation in
which Duhalde established “total hegemony” over party politics in Buenos Aires (Levitsky 2003,
129). And the FRHC may not have been the only source of Duhalde’s clientelism. His vicegovernor—in this case also the president of the Senate of Buenos Aires—said in reference to the
city budget that “in the legislature, sincerely, we should admit that 30 or 40 percent of the budget
30

The 1994 constitution established the direct election of the city’s mayor (Levitsky and Murillo 2005, 34).
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is destined for its specific purpose. And the rest is hidden financing of political activity”
(Gingerich 2016, 102-3). To be sure, the remaining 70 or 60 percent may refer to a variety of
activities such as patronage and corruption. Given the PJ’s increasing use of clientelism,
however, it is also likely that Duhalde diverted a portion of these funds for clientelist purposes.
Life above zero allowed Menem himself to pursue clientelism more forcefully. In the
final months of 1991, he began to distribute funds to the Obras Sociales (social funds) of labor
unions via clientelist tactics. He also exercised discretion over wage increases to unions—those
that supported his reform program received increases, while unions that remained in opposition
did not (Grassi et al. 1994, 153-4). The degree of clientelism shifted from thin to thick thus
indicating an increase in connectivity. In other words, Menem took steps to institutionalize
clientelism once his political fortunes changed for the better. The 1992 Necessity and Urgency
Decree that modified Law 20.337 is one example of this institutionalization. The 1973 law stated
that cooperatives had to maintain political and religious neutrality. Menem’s decree,
nevertheless, called for the politicization of the cooperatives, which licensed political punteros to
influence the cooperativist organizational structure. Cooperatives therefore lost their independent
status and became “instruments of political action,” arranged “arriba hacia abajo” (from top to
bottom) (Trotta 2003, 155-6). Between 1992 and 1995, then, one sees Menem select clientelism
as a strategy to maintain power.
1996-1999: The Unraveling
Menem was reelected in 1995 with nearly 50 percent of the vote. Yet this overwhelming
victory was not predictive of his political fortunes in his second and final presidential term. The
tequila crisis of 1994—with its devaluation of the Mexican peso—plunged the Argentine
economy into recession once more (Weyland 2002, 160). Additionally, the return of economic
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troubles compounded a growing unemployment rate, which reached 19 percent in 1995 (Garay
2017, 170). High unemployment, in turn, gave rise to the piquetero (unemployed worker)
movement, whose protests drew significant attention throughout Menem’s second term, forcing
him to address unemployment (Weitz-Shapiro 2006). His unwillingness or inability to achieve
meaningful labor reform in his first term caught up to him, so to speak, in the second half of the
1990s. Menem’s cherished fiscal pacts, too, no longer served his interests: as federal tax revenue
decreased due to the economic crisis, the pacts bound him to the minimum floor, or a set transfer
agreement the federal government had to meet for each province. Though Cavallo argued—
veritably—that the pacts were set to expire on July 1, 1995, Peronist and Radical legislators
managed to extend them and thus uphold federal and provincial obligations from each pact. In
practice, nevertheless, the provinces did not fully honor their stipulated commitments (Eaton
2005, 101). One can understand this bipartisan effort to extend the fiscal pacts in straightforward,
rational terms. The provinces, be they Peronist or Radical in political affiliation, now stood to
gain from the terms set in the early 1990s. However, other instances of convergence—as well as
more pronounced cases of divergence between the two main parties—may have been indicative
of a broader change in political dynamics.
Specifically, political competition increased from 1996 to 1999. The clearest indicator of
this increase was the electoral success of Argentina’s newest party, the Alliance for Jobs, Justice,
and Education. The Alliance was a coalition of the UCR and the Front for a Country in Solidarity
(FREPASO).31 FREPASO enjoyed some success toward the end of Menem’s first term, even
capturing 29.2 percent of the presidential vote in 1995. It nevertheless performed better with the
UCR as the Alliance, which defeated the PJ by substantial margins in the legislative elections of
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José Octavio Bordón and the Group of Eight formed FREPASO, a center-left party, in September 1994
(Levitsky 2003, 174).
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1997 and 1999. The center-left party also won the presidency in 1999, with a convincing 48.4
percent of the vote to the PJ’s 38.3 percent (See Appendix C). With its intent to fight corruption
and reduce unemployment, the Alliance captured mainly educated, middle and upper middle
class voters. In doing so, it left the PJ to secure its traditional constituencies, or the poorer sectors
of Argentine society (Levitsky 2003, 226). The Alliance, therefore, proved to be a competitive
party capable of rivaling the PJ.
Clientelism persisted in Menem’s second term, although in slightly different forms. In
keeping with the eventual negative returns of the fiscal pacts for Menem, the 1994 constitution
established the direct election of the Buenos Aires city mayor, thereby removing Menem’s
ability to appoint the individual of his choice (Levitsky and Murillo 2005, 34). Consequently, the
clientelist System collapsed with the election of Fernando De la Rua, a Radical, as mayor in
1996 (Levitsky 2003, 127). Clientelism was still rampant, however, in the province of Buenos
Aires, where Duhalde and his wife Chiche ran the Plan Vida (Life Plan). The Duhaldes made use
of a $200 million yearly budget (taken from the Conurbano Fund) to build the largest fooddistribution program in Argentina (129). Party activists provided milk, cereal, and eggs to
pregnant women based on their political support for Duhalde and the Peronist party (Auyero
2000a, 56). A survey of base units in Buenos Aires demonstrates the PJ’s—truly Duhalde’s in
this case—preference for clientelism over time with 64.7 percent of base units established after
1995 identifying selective material benefits as the main incentive for activist participation. This
figure reflects an increase of nearly 16 percent compared to those base units established between
1985 and 1995 (See Appendix D).32 With presidential ambitions for 1999, Duhalde spent the
years leading up to the election fine-tuning his increasingly responsive machine. He knew that he
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For their services, Plan Vida activists, or manzaneras, received the same amount of food each week as
program beneficiaries (Auyero 2000a, 56).
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would first have to face Menem and secure his party’s nomination. And though Menem was
president, the poor of Buenos Aires were loyal to Duhalde, who controlled the Conurbano Fund.
Menem’s direct involvement with clientelism after 1996 was, like Alfonsín with PAN,
for the most part unintentional. In mid-1996, his administration launched the aforementioned
Plan Trabajar to address unemployment. The program distributed funds from the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security (MTSS) to employ unemployed workers in local projects (Lodola
2005). Initially, provinces exercised discretion over the funds, and thus clientelist manipulation
defined the initiative’s first year. This manipulation led the piqueteros, who became a source of
collective action, to pressure the administration for an expansion of social policy through
consistent and effective protests (Garay 2007). MTSS responded in 1997 by calculating the
actual number of poor unemployed individuals per province and allotting funds according to
these calculations. Provinces with greater numbers of unemployed poor residents thus received
more funds (Weitz-Shapiro 2006, 127). As a result, the program shifted from an overtly political,
clientelist distribution of funds to need-based standards. Another significant change was that
municipalities and NGOs implemented most Plan Trabajar projects, essentially cutting out the
middleman in the form of provincial governments (135, fn 30). Moreover, Menem committed to
the program by increasing its beneficiaries from 62, 083 in 1996 to 126,264 in 1997 (Garay
2007, 312). The final years of Menem’s presidency therefore tell a more complicated story
regarding the use of clientelism than prior years. While the PJ continued to prefer clientelism, the
strategy was no longer generally suitable. Indeed, Menem was quick to repair Plan Trabajar’s
clientelist image, but Duhalde further invested in the strategy.
VII.

Discussion

This study finds some support for both hypotheses through a series of tests characteristic
of the process tracing technique. The competition hypothesis, depicted in Table 5, passes a
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straw-in-the-wind test. Competition and clientelism covary when one considers Menem’s
strategic calculus. Low levels of competition marked his first years in office. The country as a
whole found itself in extremely unfavorable economic circumstances, and the UCR, the PJ’s
main rival, discredited itself during the Alfonsín administration. Hence, politicians and citizens
across the political spectrum hoped Menem would turn the tide. He was cognizant of both their
expectations for his presidency and dependence on him. When asked about the possibility of a
challenger taking his position, he often replied, “it’s me or chaos” (Gallo 2008, 95). There were,
in other words, low levels of political competition from 1989 to 1991. This trend would largely
hold through the presidential elections of 1995, with Argentines repeatedly rewarding the
Peronist party in the legislative elections of 1991 and 1993 for the party’s successful resolution
of the economic crisis. Two new parties (FREPASO and MODIN) entered the party system in
the 1992-1995 period, but this development increased ideological polarization more than
competition. In fact, the emergence of these parties arguably further diluted the PJ’s competition.
Table 2 shows an 18.2 percentage increase in FREPASO’s vote share between the legislative
elections of 1993 and 1995. Meanwhile, the UCR and MODIN suffered losses of 8.5 and 4.1
percent, respectively, whereas the PJ experienced almost no change in support from 1993 to
1995. FREPASO’s electoral success, though noteworthy, did not generate meaningful
competition, because it failed to a) attract enough members of the business community, and b)
did not cater to the PJ’s most important constituency: the poor. One PJ activist elaborates on the
latter that, “FREPASO has no organization and no power…FREPASO has built up a team of
journalists and people who denounce corruption, which is fine. But what good does that do us
here in the shantytown? We need access to real things” (quoted in Levitsky 2003, 197).
Therefore, the political situation around the PJ changed in the 1992-1995 years but not to the
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point where it affected the party: competition remained low for the majority of this time period,
increasing slightly toward the 1995 elections. The PJ’s performance in the polls reinforced the
party’s clientelist strategy; the more clientelism delivered, the more the party pursued it.
Table 2. Percentage Change in Total Vote for Lower House Electionsa
Party
Justicialista Party (PJ)
Radical Civic Union
(UCR)
Democratic Center
Union (UCeDe)
Front for a Country in
Solidarity (FREPASO)
Movement for Dignity
and Independence
(MODIN)
Alliance for Jobs,
Justice, and Education
(Alianza)b
Action for the Republic
Minor and provincial
parties

1991-1993
2.3

1993-1995
0.5

1995-1997
-6.7

1997-1999
-3.3

1.2

-8.5

-

-

-2.6

0.6

-2.6

-

-

18.2

-

-

-

-4.1

-0.8

-

-

-

-

-0.2

-

-

-

4.1

-9.2

-6.7

2.9

0.9

a

Notes: Calculated from electoral results in Levitsky (2003, see Appendix C)
b
UCR and FREPASO

Table 3. Electoral Results for Presidential Elections, 1995 and 1999
Party

1995

1999

Justicialista Party (PJ)
Radical Civic Union
(UCR)
Front for a Country in
Solidarity
(FREPASO)
Movement for Dignity
and Independence
(MODIN)
Alliance for Jobs,
Justice, and Education
Action for the
Republic (Alianza)

49.9

38.3

Percentage
change
-11.6

17

-

-

29.2

-

-

1.7

-

-

-

48.4

48.4

-

10.2

10.2
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Minor and provincial
parties

2.2

3.1

0.9

Table 4. Party System Compositiona
1989-1991
PJ
UCR
UCeDe

1992-1995
PJ
UCR
UCeDe
FREPASO
MODIN

1996-1999b
PJ
Alianza
Action for the Republic

a

Notes: Minor and provincial parties are considered to exist outside the party system.
b
Excluded from this time period are those parties (UCeDe and MODIN) that failed to capture at least 1 percent of
the vote in legislative or presidential elections.

The Argentine party system became a two-party system once more in Menem’s final
years as president (See Tables 3 and 4). The UCR-FREPASO coalition, the Alliance, proved to
be a formidable opponent and captured the PJ’s margin of victory by offering middle and upper
class citizens a clear, ideological alternative to the PJ grounded in clean government. In the
promotion of competition, then, parties’ efficacy in contesting the main party matters more than
the actual number of parties in existence (Dalton 2008). This uptick in competition left the PJ to
focus solely on working and lower class voters, causing it to double down on its clientelist
strategy. Yet not all members of the party’s traditional poor constituency approved of the
strategy by the time the Alliance endangered the PJ’s control of Argentine politics. Menem and
Cavallo shielded peripheral provinces from neoliberal policies in the early 1990s through
discretionary transfers to fund clientelist networks. By staggering the implementation of
neoliberalism, the two could more effectively handle resistance to their efforts. However, the
same belt-tightening reforms that jolted industrial provinces at the outset of Menem’s presidency
reached the peripheral provinces after 1995 (Gibson and Calvo 2000). These provinces
furthermore became the hotbeds of the piquetero movement, which forced Menem to move
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beyond clientelism to establish legitimate forms of social assistance through workfare programs
(See Appendix E). One thus sees Menem revise the PJ’s rural strategy, while Duhalde forged
forward with clientelism in urban settings.
Table 5. Competition Hypothesis Test
H1: As political competition increases, clientelism decreases.
Evidence: The Menem administration worked to expand social policy in response to the piquetero movement.
Inference: Menem shifted tactics with the knowledge that the PJ was losing middle and upper class support to
the Alliance. Given that poor electoral results would decrease Menem’s likelihood of reelection in 1999, it
was in his interest to keep the poor and unemployed (i.e. Peronist voters) content.
Summary: This straw-in-the-wind test supports but does not confirm H1.

Another potential explanation for the resilience of clientelism is Menem’s relationship to
the Peronist party. The changes in this relationship throughout his presidency may have
influenced his decision to seek or abandon the clientelist linkage (See Tables 1 and 6). Upon
taking office, he was a party adherent, known for his involvement in the restructuring of the
party leading up to the 1989 elections but also for his poor leadership as governor of La Rioja
(De Luca 2008, 198-9). Menem caved to party demands concerning the implementation of the
Solidarity Bonus, a clientelist endeavor, even though he personally pushed for the program with
a decree of emergency days into his presidency. He also failed to execute Plan Trabajar—a less
clientelist program but one that would shortchange the provinces—in 1989 despite his public
intent to do so. It appears that he entered the clientelist system yet could not leverage it to his
benefit: the provinces and PJ party leadership denied him free rein on his use of clientelism,
while they granted it with respect to the economy. His success in the economic arena, though,
unlocked any preexisting restrictions.
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In the years of the second case study, Menem was the PJ. Through the fiscal pacts, he
imposed an “immediate and huge loss in revenue to the provinces” (Eaton 2005, 99). The move
was strategic and explicitly intended to increase central control over provincial revenues to
prevent the strengthening of provincial patronage networks—networks that were not loyal to or
controlled by Menem at the time (Gordin 2006, 270). Additional new methods of clientelist
control included Law 20.337, allowing for the politicization of cooperatives. After 1996, the PJ
simply tolerated Menem. The clearest example of the party’s apathy toward him was perhaps its
endorsement of Duhalde as the PJ candidate for president in 1998. Still, leading up to 1996,
Menem maximized his position relative to the PJ to make clientelism work for him. Future
research must explore alternative inferences, but, for the time being, the passage of two straw-inthe-wind tests strengthens the hypothesis that Menem’s relationship to the party explains the
resilience of clientelism. When Menem found himself in favorable political circumstances,
clientelism stemmed from the national government, benefitting mostly Menem. In contrast,
provincial clientelism, with its apparent restrictions on the executive, prevailed when Menem had
less political room in which to maneuver.
Table 6. Relationship to Party Hypothesis Test
H2: Executive leaders are more likely to select clientelism when in a dominant position relative to their
party.
Evidence: Though he expressed interest in both, Menem did not push for the Solidarity Bonus or Plan
Trabajar after taking office.
Inference: He was unable or unwilling to overcome the PJ’s resistance to the plans.
Summary: This straw-in-the-wind test supports but does not confirm H2.
H2: Executive leaders are more likely to select clientelism when in a dominant position relative to their
party.
Evidence: Menem signed Law 20.337 which allowed for the politicization of cooperatives in 1992.
Inference: Upon his resolution of the economic crisis, Menem dominated the PJ and hence set the agenda
regarding those strategies that best suited him.
Summary: This straw-in-the-wind test supports but does not confirm H2.
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VIII. Conclusion
Several findings emerge from this study. For one, a reconstruction of the concept reveals
that clientelism is systematic in nature, strategic, and discretionary. All of these characteristics
are essential to understanding the concept’s inner workings and effects. The study observed
variation in the phenomenon over the course of a single individual’s presidency, suggesting that
clientelism is situational. Indeed, this very individual, Carlos Menem, relied on clientelism at
different points in his presidency as he saw fit. An important caveat, however, is that the
existence of clientelism elsewhere also restricted Menem. Two variables, political competition
and Menem’s relationship to the Peronist party, explain the resilience of the dependent variable. I
find that clientelism decreased as competition increased and Menem was more likely to pursue
the strategy when he faced the least amount of resistance from the PJ. The second of these
hypotheses is a new addition to the literature. Though the study fails to confirm or eliminate
either hypothesis, that both passed straw-in-the-wind tests suggests that these propositions
warrant further study. Future research might do well to create two new types of clientelism:
central and provincial. The types refer to the source of clientelism; that is, they specify whether
politicians at the national or provincial level are pursuing the strategy. Using these types, the
literature might develop a model, or life cycle, of the concept to understand resilience. A final
recommendation is that the discipline of political science carefully consider psychological
explanations for the mechanisms of clientelism. As this camp in the literature expands, it will be
important to rigorously test its findings and, if appropriate, more fully incorporate them into
existing explanations.
Perhaps my argument for the significance of a president’s relationship to his party is
complicated. Yet, such an argument may be fitting as clientelism is a complex phenomenon. It is
at once the guarantor of democracy, facilitating fundamental economic change with some level
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of accountability for politicians—who must exchange benefits to citizens for continued political
support—and the assailant breaking down necessary democratic institutions. It is the guardianassailant…a collection of contradictions.
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Appendix A
A Return to Mechanisms
To be clear, this thesis explores why politicians use clientelism—a question of political
strategy—and thus approaches empirical concerns entirely from the patron’s perspective. It
assumes that clients will return the favor at the ballot box without explicating why they do so.
Yet, in the clientelism literature, scholars conceive of the mechanisms question (i.e. why
clientelism works) as fundamental, with influential works explicitly including it as a necessary
precursor to the main question of interest (e.g., Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes et al. 2013). I was
unable to pursue two questions with the care that each requires but have reached a tentative
conclusion that political science’s reliance on the instrumental approach may be cause for
concern.
Apart from the cultural school, the leading explanations in the extant literature fall
squarely under the instrumental category. Recent scholarship, however, questions instrumental
dominance in a convincing manner. In particular, the work of Lawson and Greene (2014) is a
welcome addition to the literature. They challenge the instrumentalist view by identifying cases
of clientelism in which monitoring is not possible or does not occur. Clientelism’s persistence
under these circumstances signals that fear does not fully explain voter compliance. Instead,
voters feel indebted to patrons who provide them with gifts and therefore reciprocate with their
political support. Feelings of obligation vary according to the gift’s value—good and services
that are of significant value to clients elicit greater levels of obligation (65). And, when voting,
clients prioritize past experience over potential future benefits. For instance, 48.6 percent of
Mexican voters who received benefits from, and voted for, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ party
admitted that they did not believe Cárdenas would win (70). The instrumental view cannot
explain why voters would support a candidate who would be unable to maintain the clientelist
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linkage. Nevertheless, Lawson and Greene note that the obligatory approach likewise faces
limitations—the first of which some instrumental models also recognize. Some votes may be too
expensive to court via clientelism because of a citizen’s economic status or overwhelming
political leanings. In addition—and uniquely accounted for by the obligatory approach—the
desire to reciprocate may compete with civic obligations (64). An internal onus to abide by the
law and uphold democracy places some votes out of reach. On this second limitation, data shows
that civic education campaigns reduce support for clientelism. In other words, voters’
perceptions of the clientelist arrangement are not immutable (72).
Lawson and Greene’s work is part of an emergent camp in the literature, which
emphasizes psychological mechanisms in the explication of clientelism’s resilience. In line with
the discipline of psychology, this camp highlights subjective aspects of the clientelist
relationship. It focuses almost exclusively on the demand side, albeit with greater structure than
the cultural school from which it emerges. For example, Landini (2013) explicates the link
between the worldview of clients and clientelism, finding that the former facilitates the
development of the latter. Clients expect politicians to help citizens in need through a network of
personal relationships (120). Nonetheless, even though clients expect assistance they do not
actively seek or approve of its inseparable political characteristics (122-3). In conjunction, clients
want assistance but reject their roles as pawns in a larger political game. Clientelism persists,
then, because it effectively fulfills what is arguably the most important client expectation—that
of personalized aid in a hierarchical context.
At this point, it is instructive to explore areas of consensus between the two main
categories. Both the instrumental and obligatory approaches assert that clientelism continues
only so long as resources flow (e.g., Stokes et al. 2013; Auyero 2000a, 74). The two diverge on
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what spells the end of clientelism, though. Instrumentalists contend that a move away from
clientelism requires that voters no longer believe their individual voting behavior determines
their individual prosperity. Obligatory scholars, by contrast, stress a normative component. It
appears unlikely that these prescriptions are mutually exclusive.
In general, the literature underscores the complex nature of clientelism through the
interaction of various variables. Interaction among schools of thought, nevertheless, is not as
prevalent. I observed high levels of isolation in the literature at times between the instrumental
and obligatory camps. Such isolation may be suggestive of a broader theoretical debate on
rationality. Rational choice approaches are now well-developed in the literature but one would
do well to remember that the superiority of this approach is usually “more assumed than
demonstrated” (Weyland 2002, 69). That democratization and periods of economic crisis have
not extinguished clientelism suggests that something else is at work. Political science need not
desert rational choice—indeed, it would likely be unwise to do so—but should more willingly
embrace psychological perspectives. Psychology appears better positioned than cultural
approaches to rival the rational paradigm. Certainly, the parsimonious rational actor model
remains appealing, but may be “psychologically unrealistic.” Moreover, the “alternative to
simple and precise models is not chaos” (Kahneman 2003, 1449). Political science would thus
benefit from incorporating psychological insights to understand the resilience of clientelism. As
this camp in the literature expands, it will be important to test its findings rigorously and, if
appropriate, more fully incorporate them into existing explanations.
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Appendix B
Process Tracing Test for Causal Inference

Necessary for Affirming
Causal Inference

Source: Collier 2011, 825

No

Sufficient for Affirming Causal Inference
No
Straw-in-the-Wind
a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but
does not confirm it.
b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is
slightly weakened.
c. Implications for rival hypotheses:
Passing slightly weakens them
Failing slightly strengthens them
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Appendix C
Table 1: Argentine Electoral Results, 1991-9 (Percentage of Valid Vote)

Source: Levitsky 2003, 182
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Appendix D
Table 2: The increasing role of material benefits in fostering PJ activist participation*
(percentage of surveyed base units)

Source: Levitsky 2003, 209

Appendix E
Figure 2: Electoral competition for outsiders in presidential elections, Argentina, 1983-2011 (%
outsider districts and outsider population in outsider districts with electoral competition)

Source: Garay 2017, 169
Notes: Garay defines outsiders as “workers outside the formal labor market and their
dependents” (1). Her definition and data are thus valuable as they closely approximate the typical
Peronist supporter.
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Análisis Institucional. Buenos Aires: Espacio Editorial.
van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. “Meet the new boss, same as the old boss? The evolution of
political clientelism in Africa.” In Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic
Accountability and Political Competition, eds. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 50-67.
Warner, Carolyn M. 2001. “Mass Parties and Clientelism in France and Italy.” In Clientelism,
Interests, and Democratic Representation: the European Experience in Historical and
Comparative Perspective, ed. Simona Piattoni. New York: Cambridge University Press,
122-51.
Weingrod, Alex. 1968. “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties.” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 10 (July): 377-400.
Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2006. “Partisanship and Protest: The Politics of Workfare Distribution
in Argentina.” Latin American Research Review 41 (April): 122-47.
———. 2014. Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Weyland, Kurt. 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin
American Politics.” Comparative Politics 34 (October): 1-22.
———. 2002a. “Limitations of Rational-Choice Institutionalism for the Study of Latin
American Politics.” Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (March): 5785.
———. 2002b. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
and Venezuela. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wolf, Eric R. 1966. “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies.” In
The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. Michael Banton. New York: Praeger,
1-22.
World Bank. 2017. “World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law.” January.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017

